



OF DEATH AND DELUSION: WHAT SURVIVES KAHLER V. 
KANSAS? 
FREDRICK E. VARS† 
Mental illness is not a crime. That fundamental proposition is threatened by the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kahler v. Kansas, which allows states to abolish 
the insanity defense. This Essay presents three examples of absurd and discriminatory 
results that could follow. But the conclusion is a positive one: constitutional 
constraints not considered in Kahler—the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth 
Amendment—should prevent the worst results from materializing. 
INTRODUCTION 
You are standing over the body of a man you just killed. You thought you 
acted in self-defense, but the gun he was threatening you with was actually a 
cellphone. In five states at least, you may be punished more harshly if the gun 
was a hallucination produced by mental illness than if the mistake was a simple 
misperception. The Supreme Court in Kahler v. Kansas recently approved that 
result by holding that the traditional insanity defense is not mandated by the 
Due Process Clause.1 Reports of the insanity defense’s “death,” however, are 
 
† Ira Drayton Pruitt, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Ian 
Ayres, Heather Elliott, and Caroline Harada for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. Jack 
Kappelman and Charlotte Watters provided excellent research assistance. 
1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020). Five states have eliminated the traditional insanity 
defense: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§	12.47.010(a), 12.47.020 (2019)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. §	18-
207(1), (3) (2020)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-5209 (2019)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §46-
14-102 (2019)), and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §	76-2-305 (West 2016)). More could follow. See 
Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Don’t Abolish the Insanity Defense, THE HILL (May 18, 2020, 
9:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/497726-dont-abolish-the-insanity-defense [https://perma.cc/ 
SS9J-XPJX] (explaining that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kahler “gave a green light to every state 
in the union to effectively abolish the insanity defense”). 
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greatly exaggerated.2 All but a handful of states have a meaningful insanity 
defense, and most will likely keep the defense even though they are not 
required to do so by due process. This Essay argues that the principles 
underlying the insanity defense are so fundamental that other constitutional 
provisions require government to retain much of the defense’s structure and 
coverage. At a minimum, states must provide the mentally ill with the same 
access to other criminal law defenses enjoyed by neurotypical individuals.3 
This Essay proceeds in five parts. The first part summarizes the opinions in 
Kahler, giving particular attention to a pair of hypotheticals posed by Justice 
Breyer in dissent. The hypotheticals show that, in Kansas, criminal responsibility 
can arbitrarily turn on the content of one’s delusion. Parts two and three offer 
two more pairs of hypotheticals that are even more damning than the first. In 
each case, individuals with mental illness are punished for their disease. The 
final two parts argue that the irrationality and outright discrimination illustrated 
by the three examples violate equal protection and the Eighth Amendment. The 
Kahler Court let the traditional insanity defense die, but it cannot kill the 
animating principle of punishment based on culpability. 
I.  THE KAHLER OPINIONS 
James Kahler was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.4 At 
trial, he was allowed to introduce evidence that his severe depression had 
prevented him from forming the intent to kill (i.e., that he lacked mens rea), 
and, at sentencing, he was allowed to offer additional evidence of his mental 
illness in mitigation.5 What he was not allowed to do under Kansas law, 
however, was introduce evidence that, because of his mental illness, he was 
unable to tell the difference between right and wrong. In other words, he was 
prohibited from showing that he suffered from “moral incapacity” and was, 
therefore, not guilty by reason of insanity.6 
 
2 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Supreme Court Let States Kill the Insanity Defense, SLATE, (Mar. 
24, 2020, 2:39 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/kahler-kansas-insanity-defense-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5562-TVB8] (“[T]he Supreme Court dealt a death blow to the 
insanity defense.”); see also Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Jordan S. Rubin, Insanity Defense Claims 
Curbed by High Court in Murder Case (2), BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 23, 2020, 5:09 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kansas-wins-u-s-supreme-court-dispute-over-insanity-
defense [https://perma.cc/3XAK-67FU] (quoting Professor Carissa Byrne Hessick as stating that Kansas’s 
current defense scheme is “not an insanity defense”). 
3 Cf. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal 
Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000) (arguing that the insanity defense should be abolished as a separate 
defense in favor of other defenses that do not depend on mental disability). 
4 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1026-27. 
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed Kahler’s conviction, holding 
that Kansas did not violate the Due Process Clause by eliminating the moral 
incapacity test for insanity.7 After surveying common-law authorities and 
early case law,8 the Court concluded that the moral incapacity standard is not 
a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental.”9 The Court conceded that the insanity 
defense is fundamental, but found that Kansas had not eliminated the defense 
entirely because it allows mental health evidence to negate mens rea (i.e., 
cognitive incapacity) and to be considered in sentencing.10 Cognitive 
incapacity and moral incapacity are alternative paths to insanity under the 
traditional M’Naghten standard.11 In light of variations in earlier formulations 
of the insanity defense (like the “wild beast” test),12 the Court held these 
choices were permissible. The Court did not opine on the constitutionality of 
eliminating both the cognitive incapacity and moral incapacity tests and 
expressly declined to entertain Eighth Amendment arguments.13 
Justice Breyer’s dissent offered two hypotheticals to explain the stakes.14 
In both hypothetical murder prosecutions, the accused person shot and killed 
another person because of a delusion brought on by severe mental illness.15 
In the first case, the defendant thought the victim was a dog (a visual 
hallucination), and thus did not know that he had killed a human being.16 This 
is an example of cognitive incapacity. In the second case, the defendant 
thought that a dog ordered him to kill the victim17 (an auditory hallucination); 
he knew that his victim was human, but the killing occurred under the 
pressure of the delusion. “Under the insanity defense as traditionally 
understood, the government cannot convict either defendant. Under Kansas’ 
rule, it can convict the second but not the first.”18 Kansas law, Justice Breyer 
suggested at oral argument, makes no sense.19 
 
7 Id. at 1027. 
8 Id. at 1032-36. 
9 Id. at 1027 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)). 
10 Id. at 1030-31. 
11 M’Naghten’s Case (1843), 10 8 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200. 
12 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1032. 
13 See id. at 1027 n.4 (noting that the Eighth Amendment claims were not properly before the 
Court because petitioner did not raise the argument in the state courts). 





19 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-40, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6135_5h26.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2UHR-CE8Y]. 
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As the second hypothetical reveals, the dissent was not wed to the moral 
incapacity test:20 one could feel compelled to follow a dog’s order even while 
recognizing that doing so is wrong. Rather, the dissent in its own survey of 
early sources found support for the more general proposition that there are 
circumstances where mental illness negates culpability. What Kansas had 
done wrong, Breyer asserted, was to jettison that fundamental principle in 
too wide a swath of cases.21 
II.  IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE 
Justice Breyer’s dog examples are just the tip of an irrationality iceberg. 
Consider two additional hypothetical murder prosecutions. In each, the 
accused person knowingly killed another person upon an unreasonable but 
actual belief that deadly force was justified.22 In the first case, the defendant 
thought the victim held a gun rather than a cellphone because of poor 
eyesight. In the second case, the defendant thought the victim held a gun 
rather than a cellphone because the defendant was mentally ill and was 
experiencing a visual hallucination. 
In Kansas, the first defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter only,23 
whereas the second defendant is likely guilty of murder. This result flows 
from Kansas eliminating the moral incapacity test for insanity,24 in 
combination with a case, State v. Ordway,25 that predates that abolition. In 
that case, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the “‘unreasonable but honest 
belief ’ necessary to support the ‘imperfect right to self-defense manslaughter’ 
cannot be based upon a psychotic delusion.”26 Thus, under Kansas law, the 
second defendant—who perceived the cellphone as a gun because of a visual 
hallucination—cannot invoke self-defense manslaughter, and, because Kansas 
has abandoned the moral incapacity test, has no valid insanity defense to a 
prosecution for second-degree murder. Yet the second defendant killed for 
precisely the same reason as the first defendant: because he thought the 
victim’s cellphone was a gun. 
 
20 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1039 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to suggest that M’Naghten’s 
particular approach to insanity is constitutionally required.”). Again, M’Naghten includes both cognitive 
and moral incapacity paths to insanity. It was the moral incapacity prong that Kansas removed. 
21 Id. at 1048. 
22 This is the standard set forth in the Kansas voluntary manslaughter statute. KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §	21-5404(a)(2) (2019). 
23 See id. (defining voluntary manslaughter as knowingly killing a human being “upon an 
unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances exited that justified use of deadly force”). 
24 Acting based on a delusion that self-defense is justified is a classic example of moral 
incapacity. M’Naghten’s Case (1843), 10 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 211. 
25   State v. Ordway, 934 P.2d 94 (Kan. 1997). 
26 Id. at 104. 
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Ordway contains little reasoning, but other cases provide some: to allow 
voluntary manslaughter claims based on delusions “would open the flood 
gates to imperfect self-defense claims based entirely on a subjective state of 
mind when the objective component is not present.”27 This “flood gates” 
argument is unpersuasive. The circumstances justifying deadly force are 
narrowly defined. For example, a self-defense claim in a homicide case can 
prevail only where, if the misperception were real, the defendant could 
“reasonably believe[] that such use of deadly force [was] necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person.”28 
Moreover, the traditional mens rea (cognitive incapacity) inquiry already 
turns on the defendant’s subjective state of mind. If the law can accommodate 
evidence that the defendant believed the victim was a dog, why shouldn’t 
evidence of other delusions be permissible? 
While Kansas’s slippery slope argument is unconvincing, the affirmative 
case for allowing imperfect self-defense claims based on delusions is 
compelling. A defendant’s mental state is the same however a misperception 
arises. In particular, “[a]ny genuine belief in the need for self-defense 
precludes a murder conviction, because such a belief ‘cannot coexist’ with the 
mental state of malice, an essential component of the crime of murder.”29 
Thus, imperfect self-defense can arise from a delusion caused by mental 
illness. At the time it was decided, Ordway’s pernicious impact was limited by 
the availability of the moral incapacity test for insanity, but now its illogic is 
unconstrained.30 Other cases that followed the Ordway rule cited the 
existence of the moral incapacity test as a reason for doing so.31 
 
27 Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 648 A.2d 563, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); see also State v. 
Seifert, 454 N.W.2d 346, 352 (Wis. 1990) (“The doctrine of imperfect self-defense manslaughter 
was simply never intended to cover situations such as this one where it is entirely the defendant’s 
mental disease or defect, not an error in judgment or perception or a negligently-formed perspective 
of the situation, that motivates the defendant’s actions.”). 
28 KAN. STAT. ANN. §	21-5222(b) (2019); see also State v. Roeder, 336 P.3d 831, 848 (Kan. 2014) 
(explaining that in the case of voluntary manslaughter, “the circumstances which the defendant 
honestly believed to exist must have been such as would have supported a claim of perfect self-
defense or defense-of-others, if true”). 
29 People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 969 (Cal. 2014) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted); see also Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930) 
(“How then can malice be imputed to a defendant when his reason is not merely obscured, but has 
been swept away and kept away by an insane delusion under which he acts? How can such a 
defendant be guilty of murder while his delusion persists?”). 
30 The act of eliminating the moral incapacity test did not eliminate imperfect self-defense 
because voluntary manslaughter on this ground is a lesser included offense, not a defense. See KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §	21-5209 (2019) (“It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the 
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an 
element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.”). 
31 See, e.g., Elmore, 325 P.3d at 961 n.9. 
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III.  INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
You would not realize it reading the Kahler opinions, but Kansas has not 
actually eliminated the moral incapacity test in toto. The test, oddly, still 
applies to involuntary intoxication.32 Consider again two hypothetical murder 
prosecutions. In each, the accused person intentionally killed another person 
because they were unable to resist a command from God. The first defendant 
was mentally ill and the second defendant had unknowingly ingested a 
hallucinogenic drug. Kansas would hold the mentally ill defendant guilty of 
murder, but acquit the drugged defendant if his intoxicated condition 
“rendered [him] substantially incapable of knowing or understanding the 
wrongfulness of [his] conduct and of conforming [his] conduct to the 
requirements of law.”33 
Both defendants are equally blameless.34 The source of their delusion, like 
the source of a mistaken belief that a cellphone was a gun, has no bearing on 
their culpability. One rationale case law provides for this disparate treatment 
echoes the subjective-objective distinction above: “A person seeking a 
determination of insanity presents evidence that is primarily subjective, while 
a person seeking to establish a defense of an intoxicated or drugged condition 
may present evidence that includes objective or scientific methods, such as a 
blood test.”35 This distinction is exaggerated. Objective evidence like blood 
tests will often not be available; moreover, two people can respond very 
differently to the same dose of a drug. Assessing intoxication retrospectively 
“can generate at least as much uncertainty as imprecision or controversy in 
mental illness categories.”36 “I was drugged” can be harder to evaluate than “I 
have schizophrenia.” 
But even if the distinction is sufficient to justify channeling mental health 
evidence into the insanity defense, it cannot support the disparate treatment 
of two equally blameless defendants once the insanity defense is unavailable. 
Indeed, the case above that drew the subjective-objective evidence distinction 
relied expressly on the availability of the traditional insanity defense, 
including moral incapacity, to reject an equal protection challenge.37 
 
32 KAN. STAT. ANN. §	21-5205 (2019). 
33 Id. §	21-5205(a). 
34 See generally Fredrick E. Vars, When God Spikes Your Drink: Guilty Without Mens Rea, 4 CAL. L. 
REV. CIR. 209 (2013) (describing parallel illogic produced by barring mental health evidence on mens rea). 
35 People v. Teran, 818 N.E.2d 1278, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 
36 Vars, supra note 34, at 213. 
37 Teran, 818 N.E.2d at 1290. 
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IV.  EQUAL PROTECTION 
The three pairs of hypotheticals presented above show that Kansas law is 
now riddled with irrational classifications. Starting with Justice Breyer’s 
example, it is arbitrary to premise criminal responsibility on the content of a 
delusion—seeing a dog versus hearing a dog. The Supreme Court of Utah 
nonetheless rejected an equal protection challenge to this distinction, 38 
reasoning that, in Justice Breyer’s terms, the person who hears a dog but 
knows they are killing a person is arguably more culpable than the person who 
thinks they are killing a dog. This distinction may persuade some courts. 
The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning, however, does not apply to the self-
defense and intoxication hypotheticals, where the discrimination is based 
squarely on the fact of mental illness, not the content of a delusion. In both 
cases, a person with the identical state of mind as a person without mental 
illness is relieved of criminal responsibility, whereas the mentally ill person 
is punished for their illness. This disparate treatment of similarly situated 
defendants is so irrational as to violate equal protection.39 
The equal protection discussion could end here if the Supreme Court had 
not actually approved this type of irrational punishment scheme. In Clark v. 
Arizona, the Court upheld Arizona’s prohibition on presenting mental health 
evidence on the issue of intent.40 Arizona’s scheme is Kansas flipped: seeing 
a dog is no defense, but hearing a dog is. That is because Arizona, along with 
eight other states, prohibits mental health evidence on mens rea, but allows 
it to prove an insanity defense.41 Clark relied on perceived differences 
between mental health evidence and other types of evidence reminiscent of 
the subjective-objective distinction above. As the dissent correctly observed, 
however, “[t]here is no rational basis .	.	. for criminally punishing a person 
who commits a killing without knowledge or intent only if that person has a 
mental illness.”42 Sadly, a majority on the high court appears unconcerned 
about discrimination against people with mental illness in the general 
criminal law. 
 
38 State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368-69 (Utah 1995). 
39 Id. at 384-85 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, 
and the Due Process of Proof, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213 (1996) (“The Equal Protection Clause limits 
the state’s ability to define crimes even within the domain unconstrained by the Due Process Clause, 
and it precludes making arbitrary distinctions among those who kill.”). 
40 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742 (2006). 
41 Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-502(A) (2009)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 
§401(a) (2012)), Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-2(a) (2012)), Indiana (IND. CODE §35-41-3-6(a) 
(2017)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §14:14 (2019)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2901.01(A)(14) 
(West 2019)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §17-24-10(A) (1989)), South Dakota (S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §22-1-2(20) (2020)), and Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §8.01(a) (West 1994)). 
42 Clark, 548 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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V.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Clark, therefore, appears to have foreclosed the equal protection 
argument, but the Eighth Amendment provides a backstop. As in Clark, 
Courts accord a particularly high level of deference to legislatures in defining 
crimes.43 Two exceptions relevant here are status offenses and the death 
penalty.44 Punishment based on status rather than conduct violates the Eighth 
Amendment. “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual 
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”45 Mental illness, like 
having a cold, cannot be a lawful basis for punishment.46 That proposition is 
violated in each of the three pairs of hypotheticals. One cannot control the 
content of one’s delusions, nor having them in the first place. 
No criminal sanction should rest on these distinctions, but certainly not 
the ultimate sanction. Due process, equal protection, and the Eighth 
Amendment all prohibit “arbitrary” distinctions,47 but the word has a special 
meaning in Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence. To defend 
against a due process or equal protection claim of arbitrariness, the court need 
only hypothesize a legitimate rationale of any type: “mental health evidence 
is confusing” can apparently suffice. To defend against an Eighth Amendment 
claim of arbitrariness in a death penalty case, on the other hand, there must 
be a very particular type of reason for more severe punishment: greater 
culpability. The imposition of a penalty of death must be “directly related to 
the personal culpability of the criminal defendant,” and “reflect a reasoned 
moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.”48 
Perhaps the best example of this is Enmund v. Florida, in which the Supreme 
Court held that an accomplice to robbery who neither killed nor intended to 
 
43 State v. Danis, 826 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & 
GianCarlo Canaparo, Are Criminals Bad or Mad? Premeditated Murder, Mental Illness, and Kahler v. 
Kansas, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 153 (2020) (“[T]he Constitution leaves entirely to the 
political process the definition of the penal code because the judgments involved in drafting it 
involve precisely the type of moral decisions that the public and its elected representatives are fully 
competent to make.”). 
44 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60-61 (2010) (cataloguing some of the Court’s 
categorical rules limiting imposition of the death penalty). 
45 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
46 See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 385 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The statutory 
discrimination between sane persons and insane persons is .	.	. irrational.”); Elizabeth Bennion, 
Death Is Different No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity Defense Is Cruel and Unusual Under Graham v. 
Florida, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2011) (“[T]he absolute abolishment of insanity as an independent 
defense is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual .	.	.	.”). 
47 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (due process); City of Cleburne. v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (equal protection); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 
(1999) (Eighth Amendment). 
48 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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kill could not receive the death penalty.49 The Court surveyed state law and 
practice, but ultimately reached its own judgment. Because the defendant’s 
culpability was “plainly different from that of the robbers who killed,” treating 
them alike “was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.”50 
To be clear, disparate results in similar cases is not itself unconstitutional.51 
What is not permissible is a classification that allows the death penalty for 
some individuals while arbitrarily excluding individuals who are equally (or 
more) culpable. Capital punishment must be limited to the most culpable 
offenders.52 “It is in regard to the eligibility phase that [the Court has] stressed 
the need for channeling and limiting the jury’s discretion to ensure that the 
death penalty is a proportionate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or 
capricious in its imposition.”53 Making defendants death-eligible because of 
their mental illness is arbitrariness that cannot be cured by allowing mental 
health evidence to support discretionary mitigation at sentencing.54 
CONCLUSION 
In rejecting a due process challenge to Kansas’ elimination of the moral 
incapacity test for insanity, the Kahler majority left in place a thoroughly 
irrational and arbitrary criminal justice system. People with one kind of dog 
delusion are punished whereas people with another dog delusion are not. 
People who feel threatened as the result of a delusion are punished as murderers 
 
49 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
50 Id. at 798. 
51 A petitioner “cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants 
who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
306-07 (1987) (emphasis omitted); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984) (“There is .	.	. 
no basis in our cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is 
required in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and the defendant requests it.”). 
52 See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental 
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (discussing the relationship between capital 
punishment and culpability, and its relevance to death penalty jurisprudence as it pertains to mental illness). 
53 Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998); see also Scott W. Howe, Race, Death and 
Disproportionality, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 213, 239 (2010) (“[A]n exemption from the death penalty based 
on disproportionality should apply for offenders who were insane at the time of their crimes under 
nationally prevailing definitions of insanity.”). Cf. Eric Roytman, Kahler v. Kansas: The End of the 
Insanity Defense?, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 43, 43-58 (Feb. 14, 2020) 
(overlooking the Court’s categorical death penalty rules in arguing that Kahler could bring only an 
as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge). 
54 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Supreme Court Let States Kill the Insanity Defense, SLATE (Mar. 
24, 2020, 2:39 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/kahler-kansas-insanity-defense-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/J3UA-Z7M6] (explaining the difference between a defense 
and a mitigating factor). Here’s what a constitutional sentencing statute might look like: “the death 
penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when . . . . The offense was primarily the product of the 
offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency .	.	.	.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 612 (1978) (quoting a 
since-replaced Ohio statute). 
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whereas people who feel threatened as the result of bad eyesight are not. People 
whose delusions stem from mental illness are punished whereas people with 
the same delusions produced by intoxicating substances are not. 
These distinctions violate equal protection and the Eighth Amendment 
and should be stricken across the board. But even if courts creatively imagine 
“rational” bases for these distinctions, none of the distinctions (especially the 
second and third examples) have anything to do with culpability. Mental 
illness must not carry any criminal penalty, and emphatically not a death 
sentence. Making people death-eligible because their false beliefs arise from 
mental illness rather than poor eyesight or intoxication is wholly arbitrary 
and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Court’s 
death penalty jurisprudence.55 
The insanity defense cannot be excised from the body of criminal law 
without tearing holes in its heart, the notion of punishment based on 
culpability. Due process may permit this butchery after Kahler, but equal 
protection and the Eighth Amendment stitch together many of the holes. The 
insanity defense is dead; long live the insanity defense. 
 
 
55 Taking the death penalty off the table, while leaving lesser sanctions untouched, would still 
be a very big deal in the insanity context. The insanity defense is most often raised in serious cases. 
In a leading study, nearly two-thirds of insanity acquittals involved murder, physical assault, or 
another crime of violence. Lisa A. Callahan, Henry J. Steadman, Margaret A. McGreevy & Pamela 
Clark Robbins, The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 331, 336 tbl.2 (1991). By comparison, in 1991 (the year the insanity 
defense study was published), the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that nineteen percent of all 
crimes in the twenty-five largest cities were violent. Selected Crime, Criminal Justice, and Demographic 
Data - 25 Largest Cities, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs (Nov. 18, 1999), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2059 [https://perma.cc/H6TE-LFDQ]. 
